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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment in a criminal case. 
After a jury trial, the defendant, Hilton A. Lake, was 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) of using or carrying a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 
namely, a carjacking (see 18 U.S.C. S 2119). Lake 
challenges his conviction on numerous grounds, the most 
substantial of which is that he did not violate the 
carjacking statute because, he argues, he did not take the 
motor vehicle in question "from the person or presence" of 
the victim. We reject this and Lake's other arguments, and 
we therefore affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The events that led to Lake's prosecution occurred at 
Little Magen's Bay in St. Thomas, United States Virgin 
Islands. The road to the beach at Little Magen's Bay ends 
at the top of a hill. There is a steep path bordered by 
vegetation and rocks that leads from the road down to the 
beach, and the road cannot be seen from the beach. 
 
On the day in question, Lake hitchhiked to Little Magen's 
Bay and encountered Milton Clarke, who was sitting on the 
beach reading a newspaper. Lake asked whether Clarke 
owned a white car parked up on the road. Clarke said that 
he did, and Lake initially walked away. However, Lake 
returned a few moments later and asked to borrow the car. 
When Clarke refused, Lake stated that it was an 
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emergency. Clarke again refused, and Lake walked off. 
When Lake returned yet again, Clarke said: 
 
       [L]isten, think about it. If I walked up to you and asked 
       you, can I borrow your car[,] [a]re you going to lend it 
       to me? Of course not. So why don't you leave me the 
       hell alone. I'm here to have a nice time. Just chill. Go 
       someplace else. 
 
App. 140A. 
 
Lake walked off and sat on a rock, while Clarke anxiously 
watched him out of the corner of his eye, but Lake soon 
returned with the same request. When Clarke swore again, 
Lake asked if he could have a drink from Clarke's cooler. 
Clarke said: "[D]on't you get it? Leave me alone." App. 
141A. Lake then lifted up his shirt, showed Clarke the 
handle of a gun, and said: "[Y]ou know what that is?" App. 
141A. Clarke stood up and started backing away, but Lake 
pulled the gun from his waist band, put it against Clarke's 
face, and demanded the car keys. App. 142A. Clarke said 
that he did not have the keys and started walking toward 
the water with Lake following. Clarke waded into waist-deep 
water, and Lake walked out onto a promontory overlooking 
the water. App. 143A-48A. 
 
While Clarke was in the water, his friend, Pamela 
Croaker, appeared on the beach. Clarke shouted a warning, 
prompting Lake to approach Croaker. Lake demanded that 
Croaker surrender her car keys, and Croaker said:"I don't 
even know you. Why would I give you the keys to the car?" 
App. 183A. Lake then grabbed the keys, and the two 
wrestled for possession of the keys. When Croaker saw the 
gun, she surrendered the keys but asked to keep her house 
keys. App. 184A-86A. Lake went up the steep path to the 
parking area where Croaker had parked her car out of sight 
of the beach. Lake then drove away in Croaker's car after 
leaving her house keys on the hood of Clarke's car. App. 
192A. As we will discuss later in more detail, both Croaker 
and Clarke followed him up the path, but when they 
arrived, he was driving away. 
 
Later that day, the police apprehended Lake in the stolen 
car at a McDonald's restaurant. When questioned by the 
police and an FBI agent, Lake stated that he had used a toy 
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gun and that he had thrown it in a swamp. He refused to 
take the officers to the site where he had allegedly disposed 
of the gun, and when asked to tell the truth about whether 
the gun was really a toy, he responded that he "would think 
about it." The gun was never recovered. 
 
Lake was indicted for carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2119, and for using and carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence (the carjacking), in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). At the close of the evidence in his 
jury trial, Lake moved unsuccessfully for a judgment of 
acquittal. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of not 
guilty of the carjacking charge but guilty of thefirearms 
offense. Lake was sentenced to imprisonment for 60 
months plus a three-year term of supervised release. He 
then took this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
We will begin with Lake's argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(1) because the evidence did not show that he used 
or carried a "firearm" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
S 921(a)(3). Lake contends that the evidence failed to 
establish that the gun was not a toy. Appellant's Br. at 18. 
Lake notes that he initially told Officer Griffin that the gun 
was a toy, that Croaker and Clarke both said that the gun 
looked like the type of gun used by cowboys in Westerns, 
and that Clarke said that he was not able to tell whether 
the gun was real. Id. 
 
We recently addressed a similar argument in United 
States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 1996), and under 
Beverly the evidence here was sufficient. Both Clarke and 
Croaker stated that Lake had a gun and described it in 
some detail. See App. 141A-42A, 184A. Lake does not 
contend that their descriptions were inconsistent with that 
of a real gun. Both Clarke and Croaker testified that they 
experienced great fear, App. 151A, 184A, 186A, and 
Croaker manifested sufficient fear of the gun to surrender 
her keys. Moreover, although Lake originally told the 
authorities that the gun was a toy and that he had thrown 
it in a swamp, he refused to reveal its location, and when 
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later asked whether he would tell the truth about whether 
the gun was real, Lake responded that he would "think 
about it." App. 171A-72A. In light of all of this evidence, a 
rational jury could find that the gun was real. 
 
III. 
 
Lake next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
show that he violated the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 
S 2119, and thus that he committed the predicate offense 
needed to support his 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) conviction. 
Under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. S 2119, the 
prosecution must prove that the defendant (1) "with intent 
to cause death or serious bodily harm" (2) took a motor 
vehicle (3) that had been "transported, shipped, or received 
in interstate or foreign commerce" (4) "from the person or 
presence of another" (5) "by force and violence or by 
intimidation." Lake contends that the evidence in this case 
was insufficient to prove elements one, three, and four. In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must decide 
whether the jury could have rationally found that each of 
the challenged elements had been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 
1201 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A. Intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. We see 
no merit in Lake's contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that he intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury. As previously discussed, the evidence 
was sufficient to show that Lake's gun was real. In 
addition, the car jacking victim, Pamela Croaker, testified 
that Lake waved the gun in front of her and ordered her to 
give him the keys to her car. App. 184A. When she 
hesitated, she testified, Lake placed the gun close to her 
head and again told her to surrender the keys. App. 185A. 
Based on this testimony, a rational jury could find that 
Lake had the intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to 
Croaker if she did not comply with his demands, and we 
have previously held that such a conditional intent is 
sufficient to satisfy the carjacking statute. United States v. 
Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 481-85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 123 (1997). 
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In arguing that the proof of intent was insufficient, Lake 
notes, among other things, that he "asked for Clarke's keys 
several times before he displayed the gun and placed it 
against Clarke's face" and that he initially asked for 
Croaker's keys and wrestled with her before pulling the gun 
on her. Appellant's Br. at 16. We agree that these facts 
suggest that Lake was at least reluctant to fire his gun, but 
we do not agree that a rational jury was compelled to infer 
that Lake would not have fired the gun in the end if 
Croaker had not given up the keys. On the contrary, we 
hold that the evidence amply supported the jury's finding 
that Lake possessed the requisite conditional intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury. 
 
B. From the person or presence of another.  Lake 
maintains that the evidence did not show that he took 
Croaker's car "from [her] person or presence," as 18 U.S.C. 
S 2119 demands. Lake argues that he took her keys, not 
her car, from her person or presence and that the car was 
not in Croaker's presence when he took it because she 
could not see or touch the car at that moment. 
 
The carjacking statute's requirement that the vehicle be 
taken "from the person or presence of the victim" "tracks 
the language used in other federal robbery statutes," H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-851 (I), at 5 (1992), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2834, such as 18 U.S.C. SS 2111, 2113, 
and 2118. See United States v. Perez-Garcia, 56 F.3d 1, 3 
(3d Cir. 1995). Under these statutes, "property is in the 
presence of a person if it is `so within his reach, observation 
or control, that he could if not overcome by violence or 
prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.' " United 
States v. Burns, 701 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1983). See also 
United States v. W.T.T., 800 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir. 1986); 
LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law S 8.11 at 443 
(1986) (" `Presence' in this connection is not so much a 
matter of eyesight as it is one of proximity and control: the 
property taken in the robbery must be close enough to the 
victim and sufficiently under his control that, had the latter 
not been subjected to violence or intimidation by the 
robber, he could have prevented the taking"). 
 
Here, as previously described, Lake took Croaker's car 
keys at gunpoint on the beach and then ran up the path 
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and drove away in her car. Croaker pursued Lake but did 
not reach the parking area in time to stop him. Applying 
the definition of "presence" noted above, we conclude that 
a rational jury could have found that Croaker could have 
prevented the taking of her car if she had not been fearful 
that Lake would shoot or otherwise harm her. Croaker 
testified that the sight of Lake's gun caused her great fear. 
She stated that when she first saw the gun she"felt like 
[she] was going to let go of [her] bowels [and] faint." App. 
184A. Although Croaker did not say in so many words that 
she hesitated for some time before pursuing Lake up the 
path, the sequence of events laid out in her testimony 
supports the inference that this is what occurred. Croaker 
stated that at the point when she surrendered the keys, 
Clarke "was struggling back through the water to come 
back," App. 185A, but that she did not start to run up the 
path until Clarke emerged from the water. App. 186A. 
Clarke testified that, when Lake ran up the path, Croaker 
was "pulling herself together kind of." App. 150A. Clarke 
related that he "caught up to [Croaker] at the bottom of the 
paved driveway" and that the two of them proceeded up the 
path together. App. 150A. They reached the parking area in 
time for Croaker to see Lake driving away in her car but not 
in time to stop him. App. 186A. Both Croaker and Clarke 
stated that at this point they were very scared. App. 151A, 
186A. Based on this testimony, a rational jury could infer 
that Croaker hesitated before pursuing Lake due to fear 
and that if she had not hesitated she could have reached 
the parking area in time to prevent Lake from taking her 
car without employing further force, violence, or 
intimidation. We do not suggest this inference was 
compelled, but because such an inference was rational, we 
hold that the evidence was sufficient. 
 
C. Interstate or foreign commerce. Lake al so contends 
that the evidence was not sufficient to show that Croaker's 
car had been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
The prosecution sought to establish this element based on 
testimony by police officer Curtis Griffin, a life-long resident 
of the Virgin Islands, that no motor vehicles are 
manufactured in the Virgin Islands and that all motor 
vehicles have to be shipped to the islands. App. 194A-195A. 
Lake argues, however, that "Griffin was not qualified to 
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testify regarding this element simply because he was a life 
long resident of the Virgin Islands" and that "[n]o 
foundation was laid for this testimony." Appellant's Br. at 
19. We reject this argument. Under Fed. R. Evid. 602, 
Officer Griffin's testimony was proper if there was sufficient 
evidence "to support a finding that [he had] personal 
knowledge of the matter." This foundation may be 
"furnished by the testimony of the witness himself." Fed R. 
Evid. 602 Advisory Committee Note on the 1972 Proposed 
Rules. "The district court exercises its discretion in 
determining whether the proponent of the evidence has met 
[this] burden." 3 Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 602.03 
[1][b] at 602-11 (2d Ed. 1998). 
 
There was no abuse of discretion here. We take judicial 
notice of the fact that the United States Virgin Islands 
consist of three main islands, which are closely grouped 
and have an area of only 136 square miles. Times Atlas of 
the World 33 (1995). A police officer and lifelong resident of 
a place of this type has a sufficient basis to testify as to 
whether any motor vehicle manufacturing facilities are 
located there. We therefore conclude that the prosecution 
adequately proved, as 18 U.S.C. S 2119 requires, that the 
motor vehicle in question had been transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce.1 
 
In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish all of the elements of the car jacking statute. 
 
IV. 
 
We reject Lake's contention that the district court 
committed reversible error in instructing the jury with 
respect to the 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) charge because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Lake has not raised the question whether Congress possessed the 
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the federal carjacking 
statute. See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 
1995)(statute constitutional), cert. granted sub nom. Jones v. United 
States, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998), order granting cert. amended, 118 S. Ct. 
1405 (1998)(limiting questions presented); United States v. Bishop, 66 
F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995)(statute constitutional), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
681, 750 (1996); id. at 590-91 (statute unconstitutional)(Becker, J., 
dissenting). 
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court did not at that point reiterate all of the elements of 
the predicate carjacking offense. The district court set out 
all of the elements of the car jacking offense when it 
instructed the jury on the carjacking count (count I) of the 
indictment. When the court later turned to the firearms 
charge, the court told the jury that this offense required 
proof that Lake "committed the crime of carjacking as 
charged in the indictment in Count I." App. 351A. This 
instruction was accurate, and although the court refused to 
give Lake's requested instruction reiterating all of the 
elements of the carjacking offense, the court's refusal 
clearly does not justify reversal. A trial judge's refusal to 
give an instruction requires reversal only when the 
requested instruction "was correct, not substantially 
covered by the instructions given, and was so consequential 
that the refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial to 
the defendant." United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 
1191 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the requested instruction was 
substantially covered elsewhere in the instructions, and we 
perceive little risk of prejudice to the defendant from the 
trial court's refusal to reiterate the elements of carjacking. 
 
V. 
 
Lake argues that the district court erred in sentencing 
him under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) for using or carrying a 
firearm during a carjacking since he was acquitted on 
count I of the indictment, which charged him with the 
carjacking. In making this argument, Lake relies on 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 750 F.2d 23 
(3d Cir. 1984), which in turn relied on Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Charles, 590 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1979). Both 
Edwards and Charles concerned a Virgin Islands statute, 
14 V.I.C. S 2251(a)(2), which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
 
       Whoever-- 
 
       (1) with intent to use the same unlawfully against 
       another, has, possesses, bears, transports, carries or 
       has under his proximate control, a dagger, dirk, 
       dangerous knife, stiletto, or any other dangerous or 
       deadly weapon shall-- 
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       (A) be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
       more than two (2) years, or both; or 
 
       (B) if he has previously been convicted of a felony, or 
       has, possesses, bears, transports, carries or has under 
       his proximate control, any such weapon during the 
       commission or attempted commission of a crime of 
       violence (as defined in section 2253(d)(1) hereof) shall 
       be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more 
       than five (5) years, or both, which penalty shall be in 
       addition to the penalty provided for the commission of, 
       or attempt to commit, the crime of violence. 
 
In Charles, our court held that the defendant could not 
be sentenced under subsection (B) of this statute because 
he had not been convicted of any offense that qualified as 
a "crime of violence" under the statutory definition. In 
Edwards, our court again held that the defendant, who had 
not been convicted of a crime of violence, could not be 
sentenced under subsection (B). Although the trial judge 
made "specific findings that [the defendant] possessed the 
weapon during the commission of a crime of violence," our 
court wrote that "those findings cannot act as a substitute 
for the jury's conviction of defendant of a crime of violence." 
750 F.2d at 24-25. We also "deem[ed] it significant" that the 
instruction on the 14 V.I.C. S 2251(a)(2) charge merely 
required the jury to find that the defendant possessed a 
dangerous knife with the purpose of using it unlawfully 
against the victim and did not require the jury tofind, as 
14 V.I.C. S 2251(a)(2)(B) demanded, that he possessed the 
weapon during the commission of a crime of violence. Id. at 
25. In a footnote, the court observed that it "express[ed] no 
opinion on whether or under what circumstances any 
conviction of S 2251(a)(2) could be subject to enhancement 
under S 2251(a)(2)(B) if there were no predicate conviction 
for a crime of violence." 750 F.2d at 25 n.1. 
 
Because Charles and Edwards involved a different 
statute, we do not believe that they support Lake's 
argument here. The federal statute at issue in this case, 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c)(4), is not a sentencing enhancement 
provision but sets out an independent criminal offense. 
United States v. Nelson, 27 F.3d 199, 200 (6th Cir. 1994). 
See also United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 821 (3d Cir. 
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1996). In a prosecution under this provision, the 
government must prove that the defendant committed a 
qualifying predicate offense, see Jenkins, 90 F.3d at 821, 
but it is not necessary that the defendant be separately 
charged with or convicted of such an offense. Nelson, 27 
F.3d at 200; United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 176 
(5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1464 
(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d 1332, 
1336 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilkins, 911 F.2d 
337, 338 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Robertson, 
901 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Munoz- 
Fabela, 896 F.2d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Hunter, 887 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1989). Although 
Charles and Edwards apparently stand for the proposition 
that a defendant either always or generally must be 
separately convicted of a crime of violence in order to be 
sentenced under 14 V.I.C. S 2251(a)(2)(B), we see no basis 
for importing that rule into a case involving an entirely 
different, federal statute. 
 
VI. 
 
Lake's final argument is that he was entitled to a new 
trial or to the suppression of the testimony regarding his 
statement to the police because rough notes taken by a 
detective during Lake's interview were not preserved after 
the interview was reduced to writing by an FBI agent. We 
have admonished government agents to preserve rough 
notes of interviews with prospective trial witnesses, but we 
have also held that if the destroyed notes do not contain 
"Brady"2 or Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2500, material and 
were discarded in good faith, retrial is unnecessary even if 
the testimony of the officer who took the notes is not 
stricken. United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 72 (3d Cir. 
1994). Under Ramos, we see no ground for reversal here. 
 
VII. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
 
When the defendant took the car keys from his victim, 
Pamela Croaker, Ms. Croaker's car was, in city terms, a 
block away, up the hill, out of sight. Under these 
circumstances, I would join an opinion upholding Lake's 
conviction for "keyjacking," or for both key robbery and 
grand larceny. I cannot, however, agree that he is guilty of 
carjacking. The majority draws upon federal robbery 
statutes to explicate how the vehicle (as opposed to its keys) 
may be considered to have been taken from the "person or 
presence of the victim." Disciples of the jurisprudence of 
pure reason may, in analytic terms, find this approach 
convincing. As I will explain below, I do not. At all events, 
my polestar is the plain meaning of words, and in my 
lexicon, Ms. Croaker's car cannot fairly be said to have 
been taken from her person or presence, hence I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The robbery statutes upon which the carjacking statute 
is based do not themselves define the phrase "from the 
person or presence of the victim." Webster's New 
International Dictionary defines presence as "the vicinity of, 
or area immediately near one." However, rather than relying 
on the plain meaning, the majority turns to a construction 
of the phrase "person or presence" adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Burns, 701 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 
1983), where, in construing a federal robbery statute, that 
court reasoned that "property is in the presence of a person 
if it is `so within his reach, inspection, observation or 
control, that he could if not overcome by violence or 
prevented by fear, retain his possession of it." Id. at 843. 
Based on this definition, the majority concludes that a 
rational jury "could infer that Croaker hesitated before 
pursuing Lake due to fear and that if she had not hesitated 
she could have reached the parking area in time to prevent 
Lake from taking her car without employing further force, 
violence, or intimidation." Maj. Op. at 7. This proves too 
much. If it is true that had Croaker not hesitated out of 
fear she could have followed Lake up the steep path leading 
from the secluded beach to the road, then it is equally true 
(barring physical limitations) that she could have followed 
him up that path and then halfway across St. Thomas. The 
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fact that Croaker's car was nearby is thus not relevant; if 
she could have followed Lake up the hill, she could have 
followed him anywhere. I am aware, of course, that the 
craft of judging requires line-drawing, but I simply do not 
see how that endeavor can be principled when it is 
predicated on open-ended definitions of key statutory 
terms, especially where those terms admit of plain 
meaning. 
 
The majority's reliance on a car robbery case to show 
that the evidence was sufficient to convict Lake of 
carjacking is of particular interest to me since, coupled with 
the typical fact pattern in federal carjacking cases, it 
strengthens my view that my dissent in United States v. 
Bishop, 66 F.3d. 569 (3d. Cir. 1995), was correct when it 
reasoned that the federal carjacking statute should be 
declared unconstitutional under the authority of United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The principal basis on 
which the Bishop majority found the carjacking statute to 
be a valid exercise of the interstate commerce power was 
the belief that carjacking is an adjunct of the interstate 
business of auto theft, in which the stolen vehicle is 
destined for a "chop shop." The majority adverted to 
references in the legislative history labeling carjacking as 
part of an economic enterprise in which profit is derived 
from the resale of stolen vehicles or their parts.1 In 
contrast, almost every carjacking case that I have seen or 
read about in the last several years -- and there have been 
many -- is a violent robbery in which the perpetrator has 
not even the remotest connection to a car theft ring or a 
chop shop.2 The "effect on interstate commerce" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Other courts of appeals have cited as additional bases for concluding 
that S 2119 is within Congress' power to regulate commerce that 
automobiles are instrumentalities of interstate commerce and that the 
statute has a "jurisdictional hook" (i.e., that it only applies to the 
forcible 
taking of a car "that has been transported, shipped, or received in 
interstate or foreign commerce."). See e.g., United States v. Romero, 122 
F.3d. 1334 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d. 125 (6th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d. 547 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd 
on 
resentencing, 116 F.3d. 1487 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom., 
Jones v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1405 (1998). For the reasons set out 
in my dissent in Bishop, I find these justifications unconvincing. 
 
2. Indeed, the facts of the instant case are amongst the least egregious 
that I have seen where carjacking is alleged. That is probably because, 
as I have explained, this case does not involve a carjacking nor, for that 
matter, a car robbery. 
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underpinning of the carjacking statute is thus a chimera, 
and I hope that the Supreme Court will take up this issue 
before too long.3 
 
 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In my view, carjacking cases are local crimes which belong in state 
courts not federal courts. See Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 24 (Dec. 1995) (Congress should 
be encouraged to allocate criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts only 
in limited situations; such a situation is not present where criminal 
activity has "some minor connection with and effect on interstate 
commerce". ).                                 
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